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STUDENT DISCIPLINE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WILLIAM

D. VALENTEt

RECEDING PANELISTS in this Symposium have outlined the
contemporary developments which have created confusion and
consternation for school administrators and their counsel in the discipline of students.' They remind us that the burden of reform in
school governance2 is not unlike that previously falling upon other
public institutions and that schoolmen can best meet these challenges
by retaining a detached and historical perspective of the adaptation
of all public institutions to the pressures of cultural and constitutional changes. 3 It is, however, far simpler to perceive new needs
than to adjust operational patterns and ingrained attitudes. The goals
of limited government and of maximum student liberty and participation in school affairs, however eagerly espoused, do not indicate
the correlative limits of official power and student immunities in
school activities. School superiors must still reckon with the bounds
of student discipline in specific situations and with respect to the different bodies of law concerning: (a) the classes of activity that they
may regulate; (b) the kinds of sanctions that they may lawfully impose; and (c) the procedural requirements of due process that they
must observe.
This Article will consider the nature of the roles and tasks that
school authorities and their counsel encounter by reason of recent
landmark judicial decisions. A survey of the various categories of
constitutional speech and of the distinct case law directed to classified
speech activities 4 would be too extensive an undertaking for present
P

t
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1. In this Article the term "discipline" is used in a broad sense to cover the
functions of management control, and not merely the restrictive forms of training
or punishment.
2. This discussion excludes private schools which, except in special situations,
have different administrative patterns, and come under different statutory and constitutional controls than those pertaining to state institutions. See, e.g., Bright v.
Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam). Cf. Blackburn v. Fisk Univ., 443 F.2d 121 (6th Cir. 1971) ; O'Neil,
Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1970) ; Wilkinson &
Rolapp, The Private College and Student Discipline, 56 A.B.A.J. 121 (1970).
3. See Johnston, The First Amendment and Education - A Plea for Peaceful
Coexistence, 17 VILL. L. REv. 1023 (1972) ; Shedd, The Legal Process as a Problem
Solving Tool in Education, 17 VILL. L. REV. 1020 (1972).

4. "The reasons for which students may be lawfully suspended ...are limited
only by the varieties of misbehavior which their ingenuities can devise. They are so
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purposes. The cases selected for discussion herein are, therefore, intended primarily to illustrate current problems, the need for a fresh
appraisal of administrative policies and methods, and the need for the
intelligent involvement of legal counsel in structuring discipline programs, which, if they are to be effective in school, must also be effective in court.
The Tinker' decision, as Mr. Johnston indicated, 6 undoubtedly
heralds a new balance between student liberty and official control of
school activity. It cuts away, in constitutional terms, much of the
assumed authority to prevent all political expression or activity in
the school7 and the assumed authority to exercise plenary power over
student expression under the traditional rubric, in loco parentis.8
numerous as to defy listing." Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285,
288 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S. 988 (to allow timely appeal), aff'd, 450
F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971). See note 33 infra. Different forms of constitutional
expression often entail distinct analysis and application (i.e., the different dimensions
of written vis-A-vis oral criticism, vulgarity, or obscenity; control of written publications; student associations and group activities; and student appearance and grooming). The myriad combinations which these forms of expression may take in connection
with student activities would further extend and complicate any attempt to catalogue
the legal aspects of speech control.
The Court has, as yet, not established a test for determining at what point
conduct becomes so intertwined with expression that it becomes necessary to
weigh the State's interest in proscribing conduct against the constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of expression.
Cowgill v. California, 396 U.S. 371, 372 (1970).
As to the uncertain state of the law concerning student behavior away from
school grounds, see Sullivan v. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328, 1340 (S.D. Tex.
1968). See generally Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 VAND. L. REV.
1027 (1969) ; Developments in the Law - Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1128-57 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as Developments] ; Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d
864 (1970).
5. Tinker v. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
6. See Johnston, supra note 3, at 1026-27.
7. Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Cf. Lee v. Board of
Regents, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) ; New Left Edue. Project v. Board of Regents,
326 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (three-judge court), vacated, 404 U.S. 544
(1972) (to allow timely appeal) ; Teachers Union v. Board of Educ., 71 Cal. 2d 551,
455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969). But see Katz v. McAulay, 324 F. Supp. 1047
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir, 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 933
(1972) (permissible limitation on student political activity that unduly burdens other
students). Attempts, however slight, by the school administration to support directly
a particular political viewpoint may be enjoined as impermissible political activity.
Nistad v. Board of Educ., 61 Misc. 2d 60, 304, N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1969). The
difference between accommodating and promoting political expression under the
guarantees of freedom of speech may prove as sticky as the difference between
accommodating and promoting religion under the guarantees of non-establishment
and free exercise of religion.
8. "[In the absence of any showing of disruption the doctrine of in loco parentii
has no applicability." Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1038 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970). "Viewed in this light, the doctrine is of little use in
dealing with our modern 'student rights' problems." Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281
F. Supp. 747, 756 (W.D. La. 1968). See generally Buss, Procedural Due Process
of School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 545,
559-62 (1971) ; Goldstein, The Scope and Source of School Board Authority to
Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Non-Constitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 373, 377-402 (1969); Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend Toward Student
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Moreover, the Tinker decision has tended to shift the burden of persuasion in constitutional litigation away from the student who challenged disciplinary decisions to the school officials who initiated them.9
Under Tinker, the school is undisputably a public forum' ° where limits
are yet to be defined for the expression of student-citizen opinion on
matters of general social and political moment, as well as on matters
more directly pertinent to the school program.
The practical question - where do we go from here? - is not
admirably illuminated by the generalized language and broad-ranging
case authorities cited in Tinker. The Court's general declaration that
it had "unmistakably"" held that teachers and students carry their
constitutional rights into the school oversimplified the issues presented
regarding student political expression. As to such expression Tinker
was unmistakably a case of first impression at the Supreme Court
level. The precedents cited in Tinker related not to student political
speech, but to parental rights, religious liberty, teachers' rights, and
academic freedom. 2 At best they provided loose analogues which, to
13
more than one Justice, remained unconvincing.
Academic Freedom, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 290, 298-304 (1968); Developments, svpra
note 4, at 1144-45.
9. 393 U.S. at 509, 511.
10. Mr. Justice Black's dissent in Tinker rested upon the thesis stated in his
dissent in Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 151 (1966). A fair statement of this
thesis is that where political speech (according to his classifications of government
functions) is inconsistent with the operation of special purpose public facilities, the
state may constitutionally limit expression therein without meeting the heavy burden
of justification that would be required in other centers of public discussions:
Public buildings, such as libraries, schoolhouses, fire departments, courthouses
and executive mansions are maintained to perform specific and vital functions.
Order and tranquility of a sort entirely unknown to the public streets are essential
to their normal operation.
383 U.S. at 157 (Black, J., dissenting).
With limited exceptions, his thesis has not gained acceptance with the Court.
See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) : Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 559
(1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). But see Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). The Court in recent years extended the public forum
concept to places where large numbers of the public customarily gathered (see. e.g..
Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968)), but more recently it has limited this concept of the public form. Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 92 S. Ct. 2238 (1972) ; Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 92 S. Ct. 2919
(1972). The weakness of the Black thesis, however, lies in the question-begging
classification of particular public buildings and functions. His assertion that student
political expression is per se inconsistent with the primary educational functions of
public schools is too static, and it covers too many different levels and circumstances
of public education. At the high school level one can reasonably conclude, as did the
majority in Tinker, that such expression is unavoidable, relevant, necessary, and
consistent with education and citizen preparation. See 393 U.S. at 512; Board of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) ; text accompanying note 11 supra. On
the public forum concept, see generally H. KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND TI-E FI RST
AMENDMENT (1966) ; Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana.
1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
11. 393 U.S. at 506.
12. Id. at 506, 507.
13. "I deny, therefore, that it has been the 'unmistakable holding of this Court
for almost 50 years' that 'students' and 'teachers' take with them into the 'schoolhouse
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14
The closest factual precedent to Tinker was Burnside v. Byars
in which the Fifth Circuit disapproved a high school regulation prohibiting students from wearing buttons (SNNC and one man, one
vote buttons). Both cases involved selective bans on specific political
symbols. Hence Tinker could allude to the dangers posed by such
selective bans and by the official censorship of particular opinions."
But Tinker was less concerned with the narrow issue of censorship
or equal protection than with the broad sweep of constitutional protection for all passive political expression that is deemed "akin to
pure speech."'" After specifically excluding from consideration less
direct forms of student expression that might qualify for first amendment protection, 7 the Tinker Court emphasized that the constitutional
protection of primary speech extended to all physical areas of the
school,18 and that such expression could be limited only upon demonstrated facts that would support a "reasonabl[e] . . . forecast [of]
substantial disruption" of school activities.1 9 Thus, the Court left to
future determination what circumstances of time, place, manner, and
20
duration will satisfy the elastic terms of the first amendment standard.

The discretion invited by such terms has permitted lower courts
to disagree with each other, as well as with school administrators, on
the "forecast" and "disruption" issues.2 On these issues the Tinker
gate' constitutional rights to 'freedom of speech or expression.'" Id. at 521 (Black,
J., dissenting). "I cannot share the Court's uncritical assumption that, school discipline aside, the First Amendment rights of children are co-extensive with those of
adults." Id. at 514, 515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
14. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
15. The selective censorship aspect of the Tinker dispute was one of the factors
seized upon by the court in Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971), to distinguish Tinker and uphold a universal ban on all
political emblems and symbols by students in a racially tense high school. Id. at 597.
The equal protection attack in selective prohibition of expression was sustained in
Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
16. 393 U.S. at 508.
17. "[T]he present case does not relate to regulation . . . of clothing, to hair
style or deportment ....
It does not concern aggressive, disruptive action or even
group demonstrations. Our problem involves direct primary First Amendment rights
akin to 'pure speech'." 393 U.S. at 507-08. The limited scope of the Tinker decision
was later confirmed in Barker v. Hardway, 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 905 (1969) (Fortas, J., concurring).
18. 393 U.S. at 512, 513.
19. Id. at 514 (emphasis supplied).
20. "[U]nder Tinker, speech and assembly are subject to reasonable restrictions
as to time, place, manner and duration.
... Sullivan v. School Dist., 307 F. Supp.
1328, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
21. As to school prohibitions of student armbands, buttons, and other insignia,
compare, e.g., Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970) ; Hill v. Lewis, 323
F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C. 1971) ; and Williams v. Eaton, 310 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Wyo.
1970), modified and rentanded, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971), all of which upheld
such prohibitions; with Butts v. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971), which
disapproved such a prohibition.
As to the issue of advocacy and incitement to violence, compare Siegel v.
Regents of Univ. of Cal., 308 F. Supp. 832 (N.D. Cal. 1970), vacated, 449 F.2d 788
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facts provide only the simplest and narrowest model for judgment.
Tinker presented no past history such as might support a forecast
of trouble, nor did the Court essay upon the weight that might be
given to historical experience. It did not indicate whether past troubles

arising out of similar expression would have had to be fairly proximate
in time - i.e., last week or last month, rather than last year 22 - in
order to elevate official concern from an insufficient "undifferentiated
fear" into a "reasonable forecast." '23 Nor did it touch upon the myriad
kinds of possible disruption or indicate the degree or gravity of
physical disorder, distraction, disrespect, or low level student language
that would satisfy the constitutional, and potentially spacious, concept
of "disruption."2 There is no empirical frame of reference for the
evaluation of the circumstances of speech activities as they bear upon

disruption which is not physical or patent. Speech activities may
clearly distract by diverting students' attention away from particular
studies at a given point in time; but they also might, over a period of
time, drain off an excessive allotment of student time in derogation of
general study work, without posing any direct interference with particular classes. The manner and intensity of student expression might
(9th Cir. 1971) (remanded to three-judge court on constitutional issue) which upheld
dismissal of a student for inciting an attempted takeover of state college property,
with Molpus v. Fortune, 311 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Miss. 1970), which overturned,
in the absence of a showing of clear and present danger, a state university ban on the
use of the campus by a speaker who advocated campus disorder.
As to obscene and abusive language, compare Papish v. Board of Curators,
331 F. Supp. 1321 (W.D. Mo. 1971) ; Post v. Payton, 323 F. Supp. 799 (E.D.N.Y.
1971)
Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Brown v. Greer,
296 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1969) ; Segal v. Jacobson, 295 F. Supp. 1125 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) and Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463 (1967), all of which upheld sanctions for use of obscene and abusive language
directed to school superiors; with Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970), which involved similar scurrilous and vulgar
language but which the court viewed as insufficient per se to justify summary discipline.
As to the constitutionally protected levels of student speech critical of school
policy, compare generally the majority and dissenting opinions in Norton v. Discipline
Comm., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 906 (1970), and in
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 965 (1970). For an appraisal of such critical speech, see Scoville v. Board
of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970).
As to the denial of school facilities to radical speakers or organizations,
compare Molpus v. Fortune, 311 F. Supp. 240 (N.D. Miss. 1970), with Nationalist
Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 429 F.2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1970) and
Lieberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970).
As to group protests and demonstrations and the danger of the "dragnet"
approach to student sanctions, compare Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747
(W.D. La. 1968), with Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th
Cir. 1969). It should be remembered, however, that "[tihe facts in any case involving a public demonstration are difficult to ascertain and even more difficult to
evaluate." Carroll v. President & Comm'rs, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
22. Compare Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1970), and Rumler v.
Board of Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971), with Butts v. School Dist.,
436 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971).
23. 393 U.S. at 508, 514.
24. See note 21 supra.
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not, in any single instance, rise to the level of "fighting words" or
constitute specific defiance or disrespect. However, if such expression
were to continue over a period of time, cumulatively it could strain
school relationships, render impossible the maintenance of an academic
atmosphere, and undermine educational efficiency.
Clearly, reasonable men may differ in drawing the constitutional
line on such difficult questions; the characterization of given facts and
the inferences drawn therefrom concerning the prospect and gravity
of any likely "disruption" unavoidably remains largely subjective.2"
One need not be a master psychologist to recognize that, by reason
of their different primary interests, training, and experience, educators
and judges will tend to differ in their perception and evaluation
of the counterbalancing hazards of impaired education vis-i-vis impaired freedom of speech. The educator must, therefore, be more than
satisfied in his own mind on the need for discipline; he must understand and be prepared to convince judges who are empowered to
review his decisions.
Tinker was somewhat ambivalent on the scope and standard
for judicial review of administrative judgments. The majority confirmed the "comprehensive authority" of local school officials to maintain discipline, 6 acknowledged that the "special characteristics" of the
high school environment require special application of constitutional
principles, 27 and Tinker stated that the Constitution permits "reasonable regulation."' 2 In isolation, these statements would support restrained review and judicial deference to administrative judgment,
with the burden upon students to show that school officials acted
unreasonably. 29 However, that conclusion is counterbalanced by other
parts of the opinion which required affirmative justification for school
regulation of speech activity."0 Further, the Court's citation to Terminiello v. Chicago," which some courts have discounted as a rhetori25. Compare, e.g., the different glosses and opinions based on the same facts on
the issue of disruption in Tinker, as rendered by Justice Fortas (398 U.S. at 508,
509), with those by Justice Black (393 U.S. at 517, 518).
26. Id. at 507.
27. Id. at 506.
28. Id. at 513. See note 20 supra.
29. Id. at 515 (Stewart, J., dissenting), 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 508, 509, 513. See Butts v. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 730, 732 (5th
Cir. 1971) ; Norton v. Discipline Comm., 419 F.2d 195, 206 (6th Cir. 1969) (dissenting opinion); cf. Channing Club v. Board of Regents, 317 F. Supp. 688, 691 (N.D.
Tex. 1970) ; Molpus v. Fortune, 311 F. Supp. 240 (1970).
31. 337 U.S. 1 (1949). "[F]reedom of speech, though not absolute . .. isnevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown likely to produce
a clear and present danger of a serious substantial evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest." 393 U.S. at 508.
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cal flourish, 2 pointed to a kind of "clear and present danger" test.
Thus, while the Supreme Court obviously did not mean to equate the
latitude of speech enjoyed by Terminiello, a street speaker inflaming
a hostile audience, to that of students in the compact and compulsory
forum of the public school, the reference to Terminiello cdmplicated
any interpretation of the Tinker rationale.
A further question is raised by the Tinker Court's omission of

any reference to Pickering v. Board of Education."

In Pickering,

the Court explicitly adopted an open-ended balancing approach to the
constitutional claim of a public school teacher to express himself on
school matters away from the school with immunity from disciplinary
sanctions. Did Tinker intend to place higher constitutional protections
on student political speech or was Justice Fortas merely advancing
substantially the same test in more colorful rhetoric? The federal
courts have not provided a uniform answer. 4 Rather, they have
focused attention on different segments of the Tinker opinion to
develop divergent interpretations of the applicable standard, the permissible degree of judicial reconsideration of administrative judgments, and of the precedental force of Tinker in a broad spectrum of
speech-connected activities.3"
Furthermore, Tinker dealt with elementary as well as high school
students, and there was, therefore, no discussion of the possible distinctions that might be drawn between younger children and adolescents. It is submitted that the susceptibility of younger children to
distraction or imposition by political speech activities merited a separate
discussion and application of the Court's test and indeed an independent
constitutional rationale as well.3" Perhaps, one will be forthcoming in
32. See Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594, 600 (6th Cir. 1970). See also Eisner v.
Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809 n.6 (2d Cir. 1971); Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 289, 290 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
33. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements
by teachers . . . may be thought . . . to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do
not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay down a general
standard against which all such statements may be judged. However, in the
course of evaluating the conflicting claims of First Amendment protection and
the need for orderly school administration in the context of this case, we shall
indicate some of the general lines along which an analysis of controlling interests
should run.
Id. at 569. It should be noted, however, that Pickering involved criticism of school
officials by a teacher away from school grounds on an issue that concerned him and
others as taxpayers, as well as citizens, and thus it is readily distinguishable from
Tinker and other cases involving in-school student activities.
34. See Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) ; notes
30 & 32 supra.
35. See notes 21, 30 & 32 supra.
36. "A special note should be taken that the activities of high school students
do not always fall within the same category as the conduct of college students, the
former being in a much more adolescent and immature state of life and less able to
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future cases, but age level cannot be excluded from any legal analysis
of disciplinary actions.
Unfortunately, the Court did not directly consider, perhaps because they were not developed by the record in Tinker, the various
possible justifications for speech regulation based upon general concerns of administrative necessity and feasibility that are independent
of the proximate consequences of student expression. It is submitted
that isolated analysis of the proximate results of particular expression
ignores long term elements of cost, in dollars and program efficiency,
and ignores the deferred or cumulative effects of ongoing political
speech activities. The decision does not foreclose consideration of
such factors, but school officials must be prepared to explain their
significance." Although Mr. Justice Black's dissent exhibited a sensitive, perhaps exaggerated, fear of the long term disruptive effects of
limited speech regulation on public education,"8 only concrete illustrations by administrative experts can enable courts to judge the
validity of those fears.
Notwithstanding the mixed readings given Tinker, it cannot be
denied that the decision reflects a cultural force that must be accommodated. Like the twenty-sixth amendment, giving full voting rights
to 18-year-olds, and recent state legislation reducing the age of majority
from 21 to 18 years, 9 Tinker reflected the community judgment that,
at least as to high school students approaching adult citizen status,
high school activities should prepare them for the independent exercise
of civic roles. The natural training ground for such preparation is
the high school, where students relate to the school administration
and their peers much as they will relate to general government and
fellow citizens upon graduation. Moreover, it is no longer possible
to immunize the schools from political discussion and activism. It
should remain possible, however, to apply the familiar principle that
the nature of the forum conditions the latitude to be given to individual
expression. The Supreme Court decisions recognize that principle,
and it is up to school administrators in the first instance to remedy
screen fact from propaganda." Schwartz v. Schuker,
1969). See Eisner v. Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803,
v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089
reasoning should apply a fortiori to elementary
school students.

298 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.N.Y.
808 n.5 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Esteban
(8th Cir. 1969). The foregoing
school children vis-a-vis high

37. "In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to
regulate their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views."
393 U.S. at 511.
38. Id. at 525.

39. See

PA. STAT. tit. 25,

§ 2811 (Supp. 1972).
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this problem.4" If they are sufficiently flexible and sensitive to student
rights in revising school governance and discipline, it is probable
that they will command judicial concurrence and retain that initiative.
If they fail, the level of litigation and judicial interference can be
expected to increase. 4
Only by losing sight of the productive interplay between public
administration and judicial lawmaking can schoolmen view their task
as a negative burden. The goal is not so much to second guess the
courts or civil libertarians, as to create an educational process that
realizes basic societal and constitutional values of fairness and reasonableness. These values already underly non-constitutional law,4 2 but
they now are fortified by a constitutional additive and by the special
relief provided by the federal civil rights acts, which students understandably prefer to advance in the federal courts.4"
Beneficent intent and purpose, however, is not sufficient to withstand attacks by knowledgeable and militant litigants. They insist
upon compliance with procedural and technical requirements - that
regulations be neither "vague" 4 nor procedurally deficient.4" These
are tasks which often require a legalistic skill for which schoolmen
are generally not trained. Since so many disciplinary actions are
overturned solely on these grounds, 40 it remains somewhat a mystery
40. "First Amendment rights, applied in the light of the special characteristics
of the school environment, are available to teachers and students." 393 U.S. at 506
(emphasis supplied). "We properly read it [the Constitution] to permit reasonable
regulation of speech-connected activities in carefully restricted circumstances." Id.
at 513. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19-23 (1971).
41. For example, one district court has imposed code-like regulations. See
General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedure and Substance in Review of
Student Discipline in Tax Supported Institutions of Higher Education, 45 F.R.D. 133
(W.D. Mo. 1968). As Professor Wright observed, this quasi-legislative and administrative exercise by the judiciary followed a series of difficult cases and the apparent
anticipation by the court that, without a detailed order, it would be required to repeat
the message of constitutional limitations in a burdensome piecemeal fashion. Wright,
supra note 4, at 1033. Of course, such an extraordinary judicial action would not
have been precipitated if the university and college administrations had taken the
initiative to supply satisfactory administrative guidelines in response to earlier litigation. See note 88 infra.
42. See generally Goldstein, supra note 8.
43. This preference is especially true where relief on non-constitutional grounds
is foreclosed by prior state court decisions. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d
1281, 1282-83 n.3 (1st Cir. 1970) (most of the cases discussed therein sought relief
under the federal civil rights statutes, as well as under the Constitution).
44. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text infra.
45. See Buss, supra note 8.
46. Dunn v. School Dist., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972); Soglin v. Kauffman,
418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969) ; Gardenhirer v. Chalmers, 326 F. Supp. 1200 (D. Kan.
1971) ; Black Students v. Williams, 317 F. Supp. 1211 (M.D. Fla.), rev'd, 443 F.2d
1350 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Hobson v. Bailey, 309 F. Supp. 1393 (W.D.
Tenn. 1970). Cf. Sullivan v. School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
But see Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
Regarding interim suspensions, compare Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of
Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416 (W.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir.
1971), with Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971).
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why school districts continue to invest so little time and funds for
advance legal counselling. The cost of defending litigation is immensely greater than that of preventive counselling. With all the
money being spent to improve educational administration, it is ironic
that funds can not be found to bring school counsel into the decision
making process on matters touching constitutional rights.
The need for supporting administrative decisions by previously
developed legal acumen is all the more acute because of the diverse
patchwork of disciplinary decisions in different jurisdictions. Since
the law of the jurisdiction governing a specific school district, and not
that of the majority of jurisdictions, will control, specific counselling
is necessary. Where the law on a particular question is not settled
in a given jurisdiction, opinion of counsel based upon whatever indirect
authority is available should be sought by schoolmen and supplied by
the Bar. Furthermore, in the application of precedent, as Tinker
recognized, different circumstances surrounding identical forms of
student expression can generate opposite constitutional results.17 In
the "choppy wake" left by Tinker, therefore, the courts have taken
different courses in their analyses of similar circumstances,4" illustrating the uncertain growth of law in this area. These different courses
have prompted the ranking of different kinds of expression and have
highlighted the need for careful appraisal of precedents. 9
Tinker was, in a sense, an "easy" case, involving a single, peaceful
expression on a single political issue; Tinker does not address other
contextual elements that enter into the reasonableness of forecasting
the likelihood and seriousness of disruption. Later courts have recognized, however, that the nature of the potential conflict is an important
variable. Thus, symbols that involve racial or ethnic identification
may be controlled much more rigidly than those inviting mere political
dispute,5 ° and even those addressed to identical political causes may
be banned, not only on the basis of immediately observable differences
in reaction to them in different schools,"' but also on the basis of
47. In Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966), the court nullified as an
unconstitutional impairment of free speech, a school regulation which prohibited the
students' wearing of designated buttons in school. However, the same court, on the
same day, upheld another school district's substantially similar regulation against
such buttons because of different school conditions. Blackwell v. Board of Educ., 363
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). Both cases were cited with approval in Tinker. 393 U.S.
at 512, 513.
48. See note 21 supra.

49. See text accompanying notes 64-73 infra (problems of ranking student constitutional claims in hair length and style).
50. See, e.g., Butts v. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731, 732 (5th Cir. 1961)
(impliedly condoning exclusion of student for wearing Nazi symbols to school, while
nullifying restriction on student armbands).
51. See note 47 supra.
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potential conflict due to the location of a school grounded in a sort
of "administrative notice" of neighborhood sentiment.5 2 Finally, the
school context may be such that a universal ban on all symbols and
insignia, irrespective of a past history of use of specific symbols, might
be upheld, such as in a racially troubled school where, in the past,
student activists have made use of different symbols to heighten group
antagonisms and provide a stimulus to conflict. 3 Thus, it may be said
of the generalized Tinker standard that "mere articulation of a well
intentioned but abstract principle does not always provide the pragmatic and just answer."54
Assuming a reasonable forecast of disruption is achieved, the
question remains whether school authorities should attempt to control
an inflammatory speaker or restrain an inflamed audience. The street
speech cases, such as Terminiello, imposed a duty to protect the speaker
short of an imminent riot, but schools cannot operate in near riot
rumblings and they lack the resources necessary to maintain a police
force at the ready.55 The practical question, again bypassed in Tinker,
as to how far the school must protect stimulating speech, draws a
different reaction in different courts.5 6
Cases regarding student criticism of superiors and school policy,
hair length regulations, and student surveillance and search provide
still other examples of the lack of fully developed legal precedents to
guide educational decision makers. Like their elders, students enliven
their advocacy with emotional appeals. They also exploit the shock
value of vulgarity and personal ridicule and are quick to express their
disrespect for, and defiance of, authority. The perennial constitutional
problem of distinguishing between permissible advocacy and expression on the one hand, and impermissible incitement and insubordination
on the other, has sprouted anew in the schools and requires a fresh
solution for that context. Absent controlling precedents, these distinctions can only be estimated, for the dynamics of speech and disruption are too varied to capture in a facile verbal formula. The
52. Hill v. Lewis, 323 F. Supp. 55 (E.D.N.C. 1971) (antiwar armbands prohibition upheld in school where parents of more than one-third of its students were
government personnel at a nearby military base and where there existed a growing
threat of counterdemonstrations by other students).
53. Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1971).
54. Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 757 (W.D. La. 1968). See
Eisner v. Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 804 n.1 (2d Cir. 1971).
55. See Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 289, 290 (S.D.
Fla. 1970).
56. Compare, e.g., Butts v. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 732 (5th Cir. 1971), with
Guzick v. Drebus, 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1971).
57. See notes 59 & 60 and accompanying text infra. See also note 40 and accompanying text supra.
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educator's perspective tends to focus on the damaging educational
impact of critical speech, while the judicial perspective tends to highlight the chilling impact of discipline and regimentation upon free
speech. This contrast, resting, unfortunately too often on unstated
factual assumptions, is well illustrated by the opposed opinions of
Justices Fortas and Black in Tinker. 8 As the following cases reveal,
their differences endure in the federal circuits where similar divisions
and dissents abound.
In Norton v. Discipline Committee,59 the Sixth Circuit upheld
the suspension of state college students for distributing literature on
campus that ridiculed the administration and called for a student takeover of campus buildings. In Scoville v. Board of Education6 ° the
Seventh Circuit first sustained, but on rehearing reversed and remanded
for trial, the suspension of high school students who had distributed
underground papers which ridiculed school superiors and called upon
students to refuse to deliver materials sent by the school to their
parents. The tone and thrust of these opinions, one stern, one permissive, cannot readily be harmonized. In Schwartz v. Schuker,6"
a federal district court in New York upheld the suspension of a high
school student who, having disobeyed his principal's order, had distributed an underground newspaper calling for a student strike and
containing scurrilous attacks upon the school administration. Similar
conflicts appear in cases involving protest expression by group demonstrations at the college level and are noted in Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College.62 In Esteban, Mr. Justice Blackmun, writing
for the majority, sustained the suspension of students who refused to
leave a disorderly demonstration near campus when so ordered by a
college official. Justice Blackmun's strong disapproval of the defiant
and vulgar language by which the students addressed the administration officials is not shared by courts in other circuits. 3
Placing speech in the proper constitutional perspective is further
complicated by the judicial ranking of different kinds of expression in
the scheme of constitutional protection. Perhaps the best examples
are found in the male hair-length-regulation cases where the conflict
among and within the federal circuits is quite sharp and disorderly.
58. See note 25 supra.
59. 419
60. 425
61. 298
62. 415
63. Id.
Cir. 1970).

F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969).
F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1970).
F. Supp. 238 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969).
at 1089. But see Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10, 14 (7th
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On no less than six occasions, the Supreme Court has declined to
review these decisions,64 all of which purport to be consistent with
Tinker. At present count, four circuits deny that male students have
a substantive constitutional right or protection for their hair length;65
five circuits recognize such a right,663 though on diverse constitutional
grounds. Constitutional protection of student interest in hair length
and style has been rationalized under the first amendment freedom
of expression,6 7 the equal protection clause,6" the concept of fourteenth
amendment liberty independent of the Bill of Rights,69 and the "penumbral" zone of privacy emanating from the first, ninth, and other
amendments.70 The Eighth Circuit declined to specify any particular
constitutional provision for its position, finding it unnecessary to do
so. 7 ' These divisions at the circuit level are reflective of the divisions
which previously prevailed among the trial courts within each circuit.72
64. Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1032
(1972) ; Olff v. High School Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
979 (1971); Stevenson v. Board of Educ., 426 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 957 (1970) ; Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 850 (1970) Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 937 (1970); Ferrell v. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 856 (1968).
Attempts by the Third and Fifth Circuits to sidestep the constitutional issue
were short-lived due to the persistence of the long-haired litigants. Compare Stull v.
School Bd., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972), with Gery v. Stanley, 453 F.2d 205 (3d
Cir. 1971) ; compare Ferrell v. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1968), with
Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972).
65. Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d
258 (10th Cir. 1971) ; King v. Saddleback Jr. College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 979 (1971) ; Gfell v. Rickelman, 441 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1971).
Adhering to the views he expressed in his Tinker dissent, Mr. Justice Black also
expressed the view that federal courts lacked the constitutional power to interfere
with public school regulation of hair. Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 1201, 1202 (Black,
Circuit Justice, 1971).
66. Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d
779 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971) ; Crews v.
Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) ; Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (lst
Cir. 1970) ; Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969).
67. The possibility of hair style constituting a form of symbolic expression protected by the first amendment was recognized in Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th
Cir. 1972), but not adopted on that record. The court in Richards v. Thurston, 424
F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970), also recognized the possibility of elements of expression
in the choice of hair style, but rejected the notion that hair style was of a sufficiently
communicative character to warrant protection under the first amendment.
68. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) (discriminating among short
and long hair students and between male and female students in affording an opportunity for public education) ; Dunham v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970)
(discriminating without justification between school athletes and other students).
69. See Stull v. School Bd., 459 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1972) ; Massie v. Henry, 455
F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972) ; Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970) ; Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
70. See, e.g., Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1970). Cf. Massie v.
Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1972) (refers to the right to be secure in one's person).
71. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
72. See generally Gyory, The Constitutional Rights of Public School Pupils, 40
FORD. L. REV. 201 (1971) ; 55 IOWA L. Rav. 707 (1970).
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Immunity from hair regulation is, of course, not absolute (such
as where considerations of safety or sanitation outweigh the student's
interest). Nevertheless, school authorities may be required by some
jurisdictions to adopt control methods which cut no more deeply than
is necessary into the student's constitutionally protected locks and lifestyle. Thus, some courts can be expected to overrule a requirement
that the hair be sheared, when the use of nets or hairbands would be
adequate to serve the temporary needs of school administration. 3
Review of the cases on student surveillance and search indicates
that the student's constitutional interest (privacy) does not weigh as
heavily in the balance as his primary right of expression. The shift
in favor of official interests is understandable, in view of threats of
violence, drugs, or other criminal activity that afflict many schools.
But here also, reliance can be placed only on specific cases rather than
on constitutional generalities regarding warrantless searches. Neither
educators nor judges have resolved differences of public policy on the
proper degree and manner of student surveillance and search, and
semantic labelling of such activity as responsible vigilance and protection, or snooping intrusion and prosecution, does not assist in the
making of practical judgments as to the limits of a student's right of
privacy.74 While the relatively few decisions do not warrant any
projection of their positions to jurisdictions where the law remains
to be flushed out by new cases, some are instructive on the legal issues
facing school administrations.
A few courts have totally avoided the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure 5 on the questionable
premise that a search by a school superior acting in loco parentis is
not a governmental, but a "private" act, so that the amendment does
not apply.76 Equally gratuitous reasoning prevails in decisions which,
73. [T]he evidence . . . if credited, might well justify the enforcements of regulations pertaining to the length or at least management, of hair as a condition of
taking the various shop courses at the school. For instance, perhaps nets or head
bands could provide the requisite safety in such classes, or other measures could
be adopted which are designed to assure that their legitimate purpose - safety is accomplished, as long as they are as limited as possible so as not to overly
burden the exercise of a protected right.
Stull v. Board of Educ., 459 F.2d 339, 347 (3d Cir. 1972). Cf. Roberts v. General
Mills, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
74. For a critique of the privacy interests of public school students, see W. Buss,
LEGAL ASPECTS OF CRIME INVESTIGATION IN THE PU3LIC SCHOOLS (1971).
75. The fourth amendment is applicable to state and local governments, including
school districts, through the fourteenth amendment. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
17 (1958).
76. Ranniger v. State, 460 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1970) ; In re Donaldson, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1969). The leading authority is Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), but the vitality of that decision, in light of
subsequent Supreme Court elaborations of the law of search and seizure, may be

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol17/iss6/6

14

Valente: Student Discipline in Public Schools under the Constitution

1042

VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17 : p. 993

while admitting the governmental nature of such action, still find, in
the legislative grant of in loco parentis, the foundation of a "compelling state interest" that outweighs the student's immunity from
search. 7 Only the strongest judicial inclination to support administrative discretion in this area could induce such facile reasoning, but
such an inclination is also evident in those cases which uphold searches
on the traditional ground that they were "reasonable" and not violative of even the fifth amendment, notwithstanding that the fruits of
those searches could be admitted into evidence in delinquency and
criminal proceedings, as well as in disciplinary proceedings."8 In those
cases, the courts have substantially lowered the standard of reasonableness, below the level of "probable cause." 7 The basis for such
relaxation of constitutional requirements has been the peculiar environment of the public schools:
New York has recognized that a student has a right to freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures.... Texas apparently
does not ....
[W]e cannot ignore the students' constitutional rights.
But various factual situations give rise to different standards and
procedures in light of the Fourth Amendment. Compare Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 . . . (stop and frisk on reasonable suspicion)

and Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967)
(border searches - even mere suspicion not required to search
bags and vehicles).
Thus, I conclude .. . that "[t]he in loco parentis doctrine

is so compelling in light of public necessity and as [a] social
concept antedating the Fourth Amendment, that . . . a search,

taken thereunder upon reasonable suspicion should be accepted as
necessary and reasonable." 8
questioned. Cf. Overton v. New York, 393 U.S. 85 (1968) (remanded for further consideration of a challenged student locker search). See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 553 (1971).
77. See People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
Cf. State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (search of a coat of an
absentee student based upon his past record of drug use).
78. The decisions cited in this section involve motions in juvenile court or
criminal proceedings to suppress evidence which had been gathered by searches not
covered by valid judicial warrants, and either had been conducted directly by or
authorized by school authorities. See, e.g., People v. Lanthier, 5 Cal. App. 3d 751,
488 P.2d 625, 97 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1971).
79. See note 77 supra. See also Ranniger v. State, 460 S.W.2d 181 (Tex. 1970)
(search of an absentee student having a suspicious bulge in his pocket); People v.
Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Crim. Ct. 1970) (search based upon
suspicions raised by reports of other student informers).
80. State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869, 871-72 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (citation
omitted).
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When locker searches are initiated by police request or from.
police information, it is questionable whether the administrator who
furthers the police investigation by using his own key, with or without
obtaining student consent, is conducting a warrantless search principally as an agent of the police department (which is subject to a
much stricter legal control on searches), or principally upon his own
authority as a school administrator to investigate alleged incidents
and to allay his reasonable suspicions. Realistically, in most cases,
the school superior is simultaneously serving both school and law enforcement interests. Irrespective of his subjective motive, he is acting
in both capacities. Nevertheless, the distinction, if made, is critical to
judicial analysis, for it not only determines whether the strict or
relaxed constitutional standard is to apply to such warrantless searches,
but also whether or not all the complicating procedural due process
protections afforded in criminal and delinquency proceedings"' extend
to lesser but still serious school sanctions, such as exclusion from
classes. Applied to school searches, strict constitutional due process
safeguards would greatly reduce the utility and effectiveness of searches,
and delimit the power of the school administration to prevent suspected illegal activities through special or periodic search. Persuasive
arguments 'have been mounted to give greater weight to the privacy
interests of the suspected students," but only the naive could deny
that the requirements of Miranda-type warnings, of affirmative proof
of voluntary consents to searches, and of the application of exclusionary rules governing confessions and evidence produced through
searches, would deter, if not defeat, the purposes of administrative
searches where they are most utilized. Below the college level, the
courts, by relying upon independent school authority to search the
locker, have tended to classify and uphold as legitimate such administrative searches. The school's ownership and maintenance of such
lockers and its freedom to search as a condition to granting student
use of the lockers are cited as additional grounds to support the resemblances of administrative investigation and search. By way of
contrast, the ownership interests of private landlords and college
81. It is a short step from an administrative search to the use of the findings of
that search in a delinquency or criminal proceeding where strict standards of procedural due process generally apply. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967): Moore
v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725, 730-31 (M.D. Ala. 1968); State v.
Stein, 203 Kan. 638, 456 P.2d 1 (1968); People v. Overton, 24 N.Y.2d 522, 249
N.E.2d 366, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1969), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) ; People
v. Stewart, 63 Misc. 2d 601, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (Crim. Ct. 1970). But see Piazzola
v. Watkins, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971).
82. See generally W. Buss, supra note 74.
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administrators have not often justified their consent to warrantless
3
searches initiated by policemen.1
Student consent, of course, legitimates a search, but the tangle
of constitutional decisions bearing upon the issue of what is a fully
voluntary and knowledgeable consent to a search has yet to be clarified
for the public school setting. Any discussion of this aspect of student
surveillance would be too extensive to be pursued here, 4 but one can
confidently note that, as between a superior and a student, especially
regarding lockers that are school as well as student "turf," the border
between consent and coercion is wavering in the law and is already
treacherous in practice.
A shift of scene from the locker to the parking lot illustrates the
legal significance of locale. Automobiles are strictly personal property,
and students suspected of using that shelter for illegal activity may be
more prone to resist warrantless searches. Regulations may, of course,
prohibit illegal use of student automobiles on or near school property,
but the means used to check autos for disciplinary violations through
periodic or special searches ought to be cleared with professional coun85
sel, for the precedents here are sparse and limited in their coverage.
One could continue with the student's reasonable expectation of the
privacy and confidentiality of his records, 6 but the list of illustrations
is already adequate.
It should be obvious by now that a few milestone decisions
acknowledging the existence of constitutional rights in public school
83. See, e.g., Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (third-party consent to
warrantless search of private residential quarters invalidated) ; Piazzola v. Watkins,
442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971) (state university dormitory search conducted by police
with permission of administration officials, but without valid warrants nullified);
Commonwealth v. McCloskey, 217 Pa. Super. 432, 272 A.2d 271 (1970) (warrantless
police search of private university dormitory on authority of administration officials
nullified). But see notes 75 & 78 supra (public school search cases). Professor Buss
has outlined the different decisional treatment given to searches of students and their
effects in high school, on one hand, and colleges and universities on the other, and
the distinctions of degree in the protection of student privacy expectations that may
be made between locker searches, searches of living quarters, and searches of publicly
owned equipment used by students vis-A-vis those used by government employees.
W. Buss, supra note 74.
84. See W. Buss, supra note 74, at 63-67.
85. Cf. Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253 (S.D. Miss, 1970), aff'd, 440
F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1971) (upheld student auto search on "plain view" doctrine);
Keene v. Rodgers, 316 F. Supp. 217 (D. Me. 1970) (warrantless search of student's
automobile on maritime academy grounds, upon authority of its Commandant
upheld) ; United States v. Coles, 302 F. Supp. 99 (D. Me. 1969) (upheld disciplinary,
warrantless search of trainee's luggage by supervising officer of Federal Job Corps
Center).
86. Compare Blair v. School Dist., 67 Misc. 2d 248, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Dist. Ct.
1971), with Wynne v. School Dist., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1108, 95 Cal. Rptr. 458 (Ct.
App. 1971). See generally Caruso, Privacy of Students and Confidentiality of Student
Records, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 379 (1971) ; Comment, Parental Right to Inspect
School Records, 20 BUFFALO L. REV. 255 (1970).
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do not chart the course of these rights in everyday practice. The
erosion of traditional doctrines, such as in loco parentis, as limitations
on student liberties in one area -

speech -

cannot imply their equal

demise in other areas - student privacy and search. Our Constitution, unlike the broad gauge guidelines for administrative authorities
provided by state education codes, requires highly functional analyses
to balance and evaluate particular civil interests in particular relations
and particular situations. The functional analyses must be elaborated
case-by-case, but, until a clear rule emerges on any administrative
practice, administrators retain the regulatory initiative. The Constitution does not require that all instances of disciplinary action be covered
by a formal rule."7 Nevertheless, the extent to which school supervisors
involve students in effecting disciplinary programs may be seen as a
measure of their ability to defuse potential litigation and, more importantly, may provide assurance of the fairness, reasonableness, and
8
consequent legality of such regulations.
Official decisions to develop and publish discipline codes tend to
reflect, perhaps overstress, the concern with student unrest 89 and, in
part, the intent to deter extreme or radical student groups. That same
concern may underly the fear that the very attempt at code formulation with student participation may be "provocative" 9 and accentuate
87. See Eisner v. Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 808 n.4 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1282 (1st Cir. 1970).
88. By grappling with some of the difficult issues suggested, the Board might
also succeed in demonstrating its conscientious intent to formulate policy not

only within the outer limits of constitutional permissibility, but also with a sensivity to some of the teaching reflected in relevant constitutional doctrine ....
•.* The greater the generosity of the Board in fostering - not merely tolerating - students' free exercise of their constitutional rights, the less likely it will
be that local officials will find their ruling subjected to unwieldly constitutional
litigation.
Eisner v. Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1971).
[W]e strongly urge that this State . . . encourage their [sic] educational
institutions to review their existing procedures .. .to implement the minimum
standards already in force. As an enlargement on previous decisions, we strongly
recommend that disciplinary rules and regulations adopted by a school board be
set forth in writing and promulgated in such a manner as to reach all parties
subjected to their effects. . . .The practicality of this suggestion lies in the fact
that this would evidence one more sign of the particular institution taking initiative
carefully to safeguard the basic rights of the student as well as its own position,
prior to disciplining him for misconduct.
Zanders v. Board of Educ., 281 F. Supp. 747, 761 (W.D. La. 1968).
89. The Association directs its officers and staff to establish a taskforce to a) study further the rights and responsibilities of students and the causes
of student unrest . ...
NATIONAL

EDUCATIONAL

ASSOCIATION,

STUDENT

INVOLVEMENT

(Res. 69-12, 1969).

90. Although there was a good deal of trepidation among principals and teachers
when the Bill [of Students Rights and Responsibilities] was first adopted by the
Board in 1970, these fears have proven ungrounded. Students have been judicious
in their use of the rights granted them by the Bill and there have been relatively
few grievances brought under the grievance procedure. I might add that the
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unreasonable student demands in school governance. Nevertheless, the
personal needs of all pupils, both as maturing citizens and school
clients, should provide the primary and positive incentive to expedite
the integration of student viewpoints into the disciplinary process.
Limited experience to date under school codes does not suggest that
the majority of students will abuse attempts to define their rights and
responsibilities in order to achieve student takeovers or subversions
of school administrations."
Are the benefits of published codes worth the substantial manhours and laborious efforts required to forge them? Are there legal
as well as practical limitations on the degree of generality or specificity
used in such codes? The refined answer to these threshold questions
must, of course, be tailored to conditions in each district, but a few
general observations are in order. At the higher education level, the
cost-benefit question has been answered affirmatively by respected
educators and legal scholars who have been directly involved in the
task of code negotiation and drafting. 2 Their answers would seem
to apply a fortiori to the high schools, where the physical compactness
and population density of the school environment require even greater
regulatory control of student movements. High school students need
the sense of personal determination, as well as the training and guidance, afforded by such code programs.
The problem of specificity or generality in making rules, at any
level, is also one of balance. Regulations must be sufficiently general
and flexible to cover a fair range of activity under rapidly changing
conditions,9" but not so general as to deny fair notice and to incur
grievance procedure is what distinguishes Philadelphia's Student Bill of Rights
from those implemented in other school districts.
Letter from David A. Horowitz, Deputy Superintendent of Instruction, Philadelphia
School District, to the author, Feb. 28, 1972. A similar position is forcefully advanced
and documented with respect to higher education by Professor Wright. Wright, supra
note 4, at 1064.
91. Wright, supra note 4, at 1064.

92. Id. at 1063-65.
93. The courts are agreed that the technical standards of specificity and vagueness
applied in criminal proceedings do not govern school regulations. Nevertheless, such
regulations must provide fair and reasonable notice to students of the conduct which
they are expected to adopt or to avoid.
What is required is that basic notions of justice and fair play be employed within

the school setting to insure that the standards for acceptable conduct are easily
understood. Florida Statute 232.26, F.S.A., does use broad language but the

rules of conduct contained therein are not so vague as to require the court to
declare them invalid. Although not all of the statutory language to which plaintiffs object is couched in specific prohibitions, it is obvious that the many and
varying types of misconduct which justify a suspension are incapable of exact
description and, therefore, necessitate the use of encompassing words.
Banks v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285, 290 (S.D. Fla. 1970). See
Eisner v. Board of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 809 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Esteban v. Central Mo.
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legal damnation for "vagueness.''" While the authorities are agreed
that the requirement of due process in student discipline does not
necessitate the same standards as apply to criminal proceedings, there
remains, at present, a diversity of opinion among the federal courts
on (1) the inadequacy or vagueness of particular critical terms as
regulatory guidelines95 and (2) whether in certain situations the
vagueness doctrine may be avoided on the ground of the "inherent
authority" of administration officials to maintain discipline.9" Given
these judicial vagaries on the vagueness issue and the appearance of,
indecisive application of critical regulation terms, administrators may
well have to rely on nothing more than counsel's guess as to the
adequacy of regulations under the vagueness doctrine." Skirting constitutional objections to vagueness98 without surrendering good sense
and without proliferating school rules to encyclopedic proportions is
a difficult exercise for which courts have often shown too little appreciation and provided even less guidance.99 Nevertheless, it is one which,
with the support of intelligent counsel and commentary, administrators
State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1087-88 (8th Cir. 1969) ; Sill v. Pennsylvania State
Univ., 318 F. Supp. 608, 618 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
The report of the American Bar Association Commission on Campus Government
and Student Dissent (1970), advises against detailed codes of conduct comparable
to criminal statutes and recommends rules which will provide fair notice of what
is expected and what is forbidden. Otherwise, the Commission fears such elaborate
codes may detract from the educational character of an academic institution and
may inadvertently create an adversary relationship between school officials
and students.
318 F. Supp. at 618.
94. See Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1969); Wright, supra
note 4, at 1065-66; note 97 infra.
95. See note 97 infra.

96. The "inherent authority" ground for sanctions, in the absence of a covering

regulation, was adopted in Norton v. Discipline Comm., 419 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969),

and recognized in Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th
Cir. 1969).
97. Compare, e.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1969), with
Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1089 (8th Cir. 1969). Cf.
Pervis v. School Dist., 328 F. Supp. 638 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (upheld the use of the
term "incorrigible" as directed to school administrators, though the court might have
considered it unduly vague, if intended to define limits of student conduct) ; Governing

Bd. v. Brennan, 18 Cal. App. 3d 396, 95 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1971)

(sustained

the statutory guideline, "immoral conduct," as not being an unduly vague standard for

teacher dismissal).
In French v. Bashful, 303 F. Supp. 1333 (E.D. La. 1969), the court rejected
an attack on a university regulation requiring "responsible social conduct" due to the
flagrancy of the students' conduct, stating: "However, while this [vagueness] argu-

ment may be valid in other circumstances, under the particular facts of this case we
are of the opinion that it is without merit." Id. at 1339. Contra, 418 F.2d at 168
("The issue here is not the character of the student behavior but the validity of the
administrative sanctions").
98. The doctrine of "overbreadth" is related to the "vagueness" doctrine but is
not within the scope of this article. See generally Wright, supra note 4, at 1066.
99. The Supreme Court's own constitutional guidelines are open to the charge
of vagueness. See text accompanying notes 19-25 supra. See also Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 704-08 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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are equipped to perfect. The result, hopefully, would be a more har00
monious school community and a better informed judiciary.
A school code, fairly arrived at, which reflects a community
consensus as to the practical and reasonable accommodation of individual, group, and official interests may well offer the best means
to minimize intramural conflict and command judicial acceptance of a
school's discipline program. 1 ' Even lawyers and courts are well aware
of the disadvantages of technical and excess legalism in the management of educational affairs. 0 2
ADDENDUM

Three United States Supreme Court opinions, namely, Healy v.
James,"3 Police Department v. Mosley,'
and Grayned v. City of
Rockford, °5 too recently published to be considered in the original
Article, should be noted in connection with the points made therein.
Healy confirmed the constitutional rights of association for students
in state schools. Healy requires schools to justify refusal of school
recognition of student organizations (in this case, Students For a
Democratic Society) on the thesis that refusal of such recognition
would chill and impede organizational expression by excluding groups
from school facilities enjoyed by other student associations.
Police Department and Grayned struck down ordinances which
barred all picketing, other than labor dispute picketing, from school
grounds. The Court viewed these ordinances primarily as denials of
equal protection; however, there were strong indications that, independent of the selective aspects of the ordinances, they might well
infringe on constitutionally protected speech. More interesting, however, is the second holding in Grayned, which upheld an ordinance
100. See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA SCHOOL DISTRICT, STUDENT BILL OF RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (1970); SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT, STATEMENT OF RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES (1970) ; ACLU, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE SECONDARY SCHOOLS
(1968) ; HARVARD CENTER FOR LAW AND EDUCATION, STUDENT CODES: A PACKET OF
SELECTED CODES AND RELATED MATERIALS (1971) ; INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA, STUDENT SUSPENSIONS AND EXPULSIONS PROPOSED
SCHOOL BOARD CODE (1970) ; LAW STUDENT DIVISION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL CODE FOR STUDENTS' RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONDUCT (1969);
NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, CODE OF STUDENT RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(1971) ; AAUP, Joint Statement on Rights and Freedom of Students, 53 AAUP
BULL. 365, 368 (1967).
101. Some encouragement is provided by the experience of judicial deference to
higher education codes. See Stricklin v. Regents of Univ. of Wis., 297 F. Supp. 416,
420 (W.D. Wis. 1969), appeal dismissed, 420 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1970) ; Wright,
supra note 4, at 1075.
102. See note 88 supra.
103. 92 S. Ct. 2338 (1972).
104. 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972).
105. 92 S. Ct. 2294 (1972).
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prohibiting "any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb
the peace or good order of the school session or class thereof."' 6
These recent opinions place illuminating glosses on Tinker, especireference to "vagueness,"' 7 the speech-limiting special characwith
ally
teristics of the school forum,' 0 and the adumbration of the "disruption"
benchmark. 9 The repeated stress in Healy and Grayned upon the
school environment as conditioning the time, place, manner, and duration of protected student expression" 0 clearly delimits the force of
precedents, such as Terminiello, wherein the peculiar characteristics
of a school community were not present."'
On the troublesome norm of "vagueness," Grayned confirmed the
futility of pressing for a precise, objective measure as to which words
and phrases are sufficiently clear to assure fair notice within the bounds
of the Constitution. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice Marshall
candidly stated the problem, and then answered it in what might, for
convenience, be deemed conservative terms: "Condemned to the use
of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language. The words of the Rockford ordinance are marked by 'flexibility
and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity,' Esteban
v. Central Missouri State College ....
As previously mentioned," 3 in Esteban, Mr. Justice, then Judge
Blackmun, aligned the Eighth Circuit with the Sixth Circuit. In
opposition stood the "liberal" or "permissive" (as you please) Seventh
Circuit, not only on the vagueness issue, but also on the scope of disciplinary authority via the "inherent authority" thesis," 4 with respect
to which Esteban was quoted approvingly in Healy."5 The present
Court's attitude toward the discretionary authority of school boards
is further indicated by its reversal of the Seventh Circuit's decision
in Roth v. Board of Regents."' In Roth, the Supreme Court upheld a
discretionary refusal to renew a nontenured teacher's contract and
refused to hold that the nontenured teacher had an expectancy of
7
employment that entitled him to a hearing on a nonrenewal decision."
106. Id. at 2298.
107. See notes 93-102 and accompanying text supra.
108. See notes 55-73 and accompanying text supra.
109. See notes 16-25 and accompanying text supra.
110. See, e.g., 92 S. Ct. at 2303, 2304.
111. 92 S. Ct. at 2300-01 ; see notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra. Compare
Gravned with Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
112. 92 S. Ct. at 2300.
113. See notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text supra.
114. See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
115. 92 S. Ct. at 2352.
116. 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972).
117. Board of Regents v. Roth, 92 S. Ct. 2701 (1972). Accord, Perry v. Sindermann, 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972).
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It would, therefore, appear that the present Court does not view Tinker
as requiring the same vigorous limitations in all areas of educational
management as were imposed with respect to free speech activities.
Grayned also manifests the sheer power of the Court to reconstitute
weak legislative language - "tend to disturb ' " 8 - into the familiar,
but unreal, technical formula, "actual" or "imminent" disruption. The
process calls to mind Professor Laski's critical description of such
judicial technique: "[They twist meaning] by efforts at classification which have no other reality in the living material than the passion
of the jurist to bring under the dominion of his art something that is
only so brought by the deliberate rape of nature."" 9 Functional
analysis is retarded by imprisoning the basic test of reasonable fairness
qua notice and coverage within judicial constructs of "vagueness" and
"overbreadth." Such technical terms, no less neutral and certainly
more constrictive than the balancing value of reasonableness, are too
costly, as convenient predicates, for complete, independent judicial
review.
Grayned gave a further illustration of the ill-defined norm of
"disruption" impeding a rational decision. The Court recognized that
an anti-noise ordinance aims to control non-physical interference; that
is, noise can be disruptive, if only to stir the curiosity of those within
earshot. Nevertheless, the Court insisted that the ordinance could be
applied constitutionally only to prevent "actual or imminent" disruption. The ad hoc discretion entrusted to policemen in applying the
ban, in the absence of any background history (none was cited in
Grayned), was not deemed unbridled or overbroad by the Court.
Therefore, how much more may school administrators, who operate
from a continuing frame of experience, claim like deference from the
courts? The Grayned Court did not "hug the shores" of its familiar
doctrine; rather, it shifted attention to "the crucial question . . .
whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with normal
activities ...."120 Incompatability in a total operational context and
imminent disruption in a specific instance, are not commensurate
concepts even if they are to be applied to a simple question of physical
housekeeping. Until the tensions between critical concepts, such as
"vagueness" or "disruption," are resolved or clarified, the limits of
reasonable speech regulation will remain in doubt.
118. 92 S. Ct. at 2300. See Cohen v. California, 401 U.S. 15 (1971).
119. Laski, Morris Cohen's Approach to Legal Philosophy, 15 U. CHi. L. REv. 575,

575 (1948).
120. 92 S.Ct. at 2303.
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Justice Powell, speaking for the Court in Healy, and Chief
Justice Burger, concurring, focused in practical terms on the preservation of the disciplinary authority of the institution. Notwithstanding
the administration's failure to justify its restriction of associational
expression, the Healy Court remanded the case for further hearing
and recognized the school's authority to precondition its approval of
an organization by 'having the organization agree to abide by reasonable school regulations, including a code of student rights and responsibilities. 12 ' This stance is somewhat less than a rigorous prophylaxis
against prior restraint and chilling effects, since such codes are always
subject to future modification. The deference and approval afforded
student codes 122 re-enforces the suggestion that the regulatory initiative
must remain with school administrators. Judicial intervention may
also be dampened as a result of Chief Justice Burger's declaration
that the schoolroom, not the courtroom, is the best forum for developing disciplinary standards that properly balance individual and insti2
tutional rights and needs.'

121. 92 S. Ct. at 2352, 2353.
122. Id. at 2351, 2353.
123. Id. at 2353 (Burger, CJ., concurring). "The success of any school system
depends on a vast range of factors that lie beyond the competence and the power of
the courts." Wright v. City Council, 92 S. Ct. 2196, 2211 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
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